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ABSTRACT
Despite current emphasis on health insurance expansions in developing countries, inefficient consumer
incentives for over-use of medical care are an important counterbalancing concern. However, three
factors that are more acute in poor countries (credit constraints, principal-agent problems, and positive
externalities) result in substantial under-use and misuse as well. This paper studies Colombia’s Régimen
Subsidiado, the first major developing country effort to expand insurance in a way that purposefully
addresses these inefficiencies. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that Colombia’s insurance
program has provided risk protection while substantially increasing the use of traditionally under-utilized
























In developing countries, the inability to smooth consumption directly reduces welfare and 
leads to informal risk management strategies that stifle productive activity (Paxson 1993, 
Townsend 1994, Morduch 1995).  Because unexpected illness is a leading source of economic 
risk, the expansion of health insurance is therefore a public policy priority in many parts of the 
developing world (Gertler and Gruber 2002, GTZ, WHO, and ILO 2005, Mohanan 2008).
1  At 
the same time, ex post moral hazard is a key counterbalancing concern (Zeckhauser 1970).  
Insured patients pay only a fraction of the full cost of their medical care at the point-of-service, 
so they have inefficient incentives to use too much of it (Arrow 1963, Pauly 1968, Newhouse et. 
al. 1993).
2 
Standard economic analyses of health insurance (and concerns about ex post moral 
hazard) may require modification in developing country settings for at least three reasons, 
however.  First, in the presence of significant credit constraints, medical care use absent 
insurance may be inefficiently low (Pitt and Khandker 1998, Morduch 1999).  Second, the 
alignment between patient and provider incentives in developing countries is notoriously poor 
(estimates of absenteeism rates among health care professionals in South Asia range from 25% to 
75%, for example) (Chaudhury and Hammer 2004, Duflo, Banerjee, and Deaton 2004).
3  Third, 
in environments with highly prevalent infectious diseases, there may be large positive 
externalities associated with the use of some services – in particular, preventive services.  Under-
                                                 
1 For example, one recent study finds that 5% of Latin American households spend 40% or more of ‘non-
subsistence’ income on medical care each year (Xu et. al. 2003).  As Gertler and Gruber (2002) note, there are two 
major costs of illness: medical care costs and reduced labor income.  Health insurance (our focus) addresses the 
former, while disability insurance addresses the latter. 
2 This assumes that health care prices facing consumers reflect true resource costs in the absence of health insurance.  
Health care prices in developing countries are generally set administratively, so this is unlikely to be true, but the 
direction of the error is uncertain.  For a thorough treatment of administrative pricing in medical care, see Newhouse 
(2002). 
3 Another striking example is the purposeful provision of services with no medical value because of their perceived 
benefit by uninformed patients (Das and Hammer 2007).   2
use and misuse are therefore sources of considerable inefficiency as well (WHO Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health 2001, Black, Morris, and Bryce 2003). 
This paper studies the first major developing country effort to expand health insurance in 
a way that addresses these inefficiencies – including the promotion of traditionally under-used 
preventive services – through high-powered contracts.
4  Strengthening supply-side incentives is a 
promising alternative to common demand-side approaches to increasing preventive service use 
(conditional cash transfer programs, for example), but little is known about its effectiveness 
(Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000, Gertler 2004, Bloom et. al. 2006, Lagarde, Haines, and 
Palmer 2007).  In 1993, the Colombian government introduced the Régimen Subsidiado (or 
“Subsidized Regime,” henceforth “SR”), a variant of the classical ‘managed competition’ model 
of insurance (Enthoven 1978a and 1978b).  Colombians passing a means test are eligible for 
fully-subsidized health insurance.  Insurers, in turn, have new contracting authority to form 
restrictive medical care networks, deny coverage for services deemed wasteful, and pay health 
care providers in ways that encourage higher quality and lower cost medical care.  Importantly, 
we emphasize these more efficient supply-side incentives as the key innovation of the SR.
5   
To investigate how SR enrollment is associated with protection against financial risk and 
efficiency in health service use, we employ an empirical strategy that utilizes discrete breaks in 
eligibility along Colombia’s continuous poverty-targeting index (called SISBEN, or Sistema de 
                                                 
4 According to Article 153 of Law 100 (authorizing the creation of the SR), one of the SR’s guiding principles is 
Proteccion Integral: “The System of Social Security in health will provide health care to the population in: 
education, information, health promotion and prevention, diagnostic, treatment and rehabilitation in quantity and 
quality according to the Plan Obligatorio de Salud.”  For studies of traditional health insurance programs in 
developing countries, see Abel-Smith (1992); Dow, Gertler, Schoeni, Strauss, and Thomas (1997); WHO (2000); 
WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001); Gertler and Solon (2002); Dow, Gonzalez, Rosero-
Bixby (2003); Dow and Schmeer (2003); Gakidou et. al. (2006); Pauly, Zweifel, Scheffler, Preker, and Bassett 
(2006); Hughes and Leethongdee (2007); Wagstaff (2007); Wagstaff and Yu (2007); Odonnell et. al. (2008); and 
Pauly, Blavin, and Meghan (2008). 
5 Very few Colombian counties actually had more than one insurer during the years we study, and heavily regulated 
premiums and benefit packages (a departure from textbook managed competition) leave few margins along which 
plans can compete.  The lack of meaningful competition has also been corroborated through interviews with 
stakeholders in the Colombian health care system.   3
Identificación de Beneficiarios).
6  We address concerns about widespread manipulation of 
eligibility (BDO and CCRP 2000, DNP 2001, 2003a, and 2003b, Fresneda 2003, Camacho and 
Conover 2009) by instrumenting for SR enrollment with simulated eligibility (Hahn, Todd, and 
Van der Klaauw 2001).  To construct this instrument, we calculate SISBEN scores in household 
surveys not used for actual eligibility determinations.  We also estimate and utilize county-
specific thresholds used in practice by each of Colombia’s local governments (following Chay, 
McEwan, and Urquiola 2005).  A variety of evidence bolsters the validity of our approach, and 
our estimates are generally robust across a number of parametric and non-parametric 
specifications. 
Overall, we first find evidence that the SR has succeeded in protecting poor Colombians 
from financial risk associated with the medical costs of unexpected illness.  In particular, SR 
enrollment appears to have successfully reigned-in large outliers in the right-skewed distribution 
of medical spending, reducing the variability of medical spending by one-third.  Despite this 
reduction in risk, however, we observe little evidence of meaningful portfolio choice effects 
(changes in the composition of household assets, human capital investments, or household 
consumption), perhaps because the SR falls short of providing full insurance. 
Our results also suggest that SR enrollment is associated with large increases in the use of 
traditionally under-utilized preventive services – some of which nearly doubled.  Because 
preventive services are generally free regardless of insurance status, the SR’s high-powered 
                                                 
6 Several other recent papers also study the SR in Colombia.  Giedion and Uribe (2009) utilize difference-in-
difference and matched difference-in-difference frameworks; Camacho and Conover (2008) develop a regression 
discontinuity design using birth records and administrative data from Colombia’s Census of the Poor; Gaviria, 
Medina, and Mejía (2007) use an IV strategy, instrumenting for SR enrollment using residence history; Trujillo, 
Portillo, and Vernon (2005) employ propensity score matching; and Panopoulus and Vélez (2001) use multivariate 
regression.   4
supply-side incentives presumably play a central role.
7  Moreover, we find evidence of health 
improvement under the SR as well – specifically, gains along margins sensitive to the increases 
in preventive care that we observe.  There is more mixed evidence of changes in the use of 
curative services (although theoretical predictions about the use of curative care are ambiguous).  
We conclude by noting that the full potential of high-powered supply-side incentives in 
developing country health insurance has not yet been realized and that such incentives hold 
promise for further welfare improvement. 
 
2. Colombia’s Subsidized Health Insurance Regime for the Poor 
2.1 Overview 
Under Law 100 in 1993, Colombia introduced the Régimen Subsidiado (or SR), a novel 
form of publicly-financed health insurance for the poor (Gwatkin et al. 2005, Escobar 2005).  
Primarily through SR expansion, formal health insurance coverage in Colombia grew from 20% 
of the population in 1993 to 80% in 2007 (CENDEX 2008).  The SR is organized as a variant of 
classical ‘managed competition’ (Enthoven 1978a and 1978b).  Beneficiaries receive full public 
subsidies to purchase health insurance from one of multiple health insurance plans.  These 
subsidies are financed by a combination of public resources including payroll taxes and national 
and local general revenue.  These resources are transferred to county governments, which in turn 
are responsible for eligibility determination, enrollment, and contracting with health plans. 
                                                 
7 Ex ante moral hazard under insurance acts in the opposite direction (Pauly 1968), so our results suggest that more 
efficient supply-side incentives dominate this effect.  As Section 5.4 describes, we also fail to find any direct 
evidence of ex ante moral hazard.   5
Health plans charge government-regulated premiums and offer a standardized package of 
benefits (see Appendix 1 for the details of these benefits).
8  Out-of-pocket prices charged by 
providers for covered curative services are 10% of the full price (as opposed to 30% for poor 
uninsured Colombians – with public sector transfers to medical facilities offsetting the balance).
9  
Moreover, total out-of-pocket spending per episode of illness each year is capped at half of the 
monthly minimum wage for SR beneficiaries – while the same cap is six times as large for 
uninsured patients (Decreto 2357 and Acuerdo 260 of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social 
en Salud).  Preventive services are essentially free regardless of insurance status. 
Participating health plans also act as group purchasers of health services for their 
enrollees by contracting with a network of health facilities and clinicians (Section 3 describes 
key supply-side incentives embedded in these contracts).  Because premiums and benefit 
packages are standardized by law (unlike the classical ‘managed competition’ model), health 
plans compete for enrollees on the margins of provider networks and service quality.  In practice, 
however, very few cities had more than one insurer during the years that we study. 
We note that the comparison between “uninsurance” and SR enrollment is actually a 
comparison between types of insurance and rationing methods: less generous insurance with 
exclusive reliance on demand-side cost sharing vs. more generous insurance with more efficient 
supply-side incentives. 
 
2.2 Eligibility for the SR 
                                                 
8 The benefits package of the SR (Plan Obligatorio de Salud Subsidiado) emphasizes coverage for primary and 
basic outpatient services, drugs, and some catastrophic care.  There is limited coverage for specialist services, and 
there are substantial gaps in coverage for hospital care.   
9 The Colombian Ministry of Social Protection maintains a fee schedule (soat) regulating out-of-pocket prices.  For 
example, the full price for a physician consultation was 17,300 pesos in 2007 and 18,460 pesos in 2008 
(approximately US $10).  Medical facility social workers assess uninsured patients’ “ability to pay” and may charge 
them sliding scale out-of-pocket fees (greater than 10% of the full price) on a case-by-case basis.  Operating losses 
are then recouped by facilities through direct public transfers.   6
Eligibility for the SR is determined using a poverty-targeting index called SISBEN (or 
Sistema de Identificación de Beneficiarios).  The original SISBEN index consisted of fourteen 
components measuring different aspects of household well-being (such as housing material, 
access to public utilities, ownership of durable assets, demographic composition, educational 
attainment, and labor force participation – for a complete description, see Appendix 2).
10  On 
each dimension, households are classified according to mutually exclusive, collectively 
exhaustive categories with varying weights assigned to each category; these weights vary 
between urban and rural areas.  A household’s SISBEN score is then calculated by summing 
points across components.  Possible scores range from 0 to 100 (with 0 being the most 
impoverished) and are divided into six strata.  Households scoring in SISBEN strata 1 and 2 (the 
lowest strata) are eligible for the SR (below 48 in urban areas, below 31 in rural areas).
11 
 
2.3 Eligibility and Enrollment in Practice 
Although eligibility for the SR increases the likelihood of enrollment, neither one 
necessarily implies the other for at least three reasons: misclassification or manipulation of 
SISBEN scores, shortfalls in local government revenue, and enrollment that preceded SISBEN 
enumeration.
12 
First, both local governments and households have incentives to manipulate SISBEN 
scores.  Local governments receive fixed transfers from the national government for each 
                                                 
10 Eligibility also varies within households because certain demographic groups (including pregnant women and 
young children) are prioritized for enrollment. 
11 SISBEN eligibility shifts abruptly at each county’s cabecera boundary, an administrative demarcation formally 
distinguishing urban and rural parts of each county and loosely corresponding to the fringe of public utility 
infrastructure.  Distinct urban and rural SISBEN scales are applied to households on corresponding sides of the 
boundary, differing both in component parts and in the weighting of response categories for each component.  We 
implemented a research design exploiting these urban/rural index differences, but inconsistent application of the 
rural index and data limitations prevent us from drawing meaningful conclusions from it.  In this paper we therefore 
focus on urban eligibility. 
12 Administrative mistakes in the enrollment process are also important.   7
resident they enroll, creating incentives to maximize enrollment.  The selective enrollment of key 
constituents can also provide political benefits (Camacho and Conover 2009).  Households prefer 
enrollment over “uninsurance” as well because co-insurance rates are lower for SR beneficiaries 
than for those lacking formal insurance.  Consistent with both types of incentives, there is 
evidence of considerable SISBEN score manipulation between 1997 and 2003 (Camacho and 
Conover 2009).
13 
Second, most local governments lack sufficient revenue to finance the enrollment of all 
eligible residents.  According to law, those with lower SISBEN scores and those belonging to 
certain targeted groups (such as children under five and pregnant women) are therefore 
prioritized for enrollment.
14  This means that many counties use de facto eligibility thresholds 
that fall below the uniform national threshold. 
Third, some counties began enrolling residents in the SR before all of their residents had 
been classified using SISBEN.  These counties instead used other means-test criteria such as 
residents’ estrato, an alternative poverty measure used to establish electricity prices paid by local 
households. 
In general, these practical considerations have two broad implications for our empirical 
analyses.  One is the necessity of an empirical strategy that addresses manipulation of official SR 
eligibility and enrollment.  Section 4.2 describes our instrumental variables approach of 
simulating eligibility with household data not used for eligibility determinations and then 
                                                 
13 Using results from the 2005 population census, the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo reports that there are more 
SR enrollees than residents in some counties (El Tiempo, October 26, 2006).  Camacho and Conover (2009) show 
that the distribution of official SISBEN scores exhibits both large leftward shifts in density over time and the 
formation of a mass point just to the left of the national eligibility threshold in urban areas.  Neither are present in 
Colombian household surveys.  The former suggests misrepresentation by households, while the latter suggests 
misrepresentation by enumerators or officials. 
14 The laws formalizing this prioritization are Acuerdos 244 and 253 of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social 
en Salud.  This prioritization also means that although SISBEN scores are calculated at the level of family 
“nucleus,” individuals within families can vary in enrollment status; we observe this in our household survey data.   8
instrumenting for enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The other is that our first stage 
regressions (of enrollment on predicted eligibility, as presented in Section 4.2) will be weaker 
than if eligibility mapped cleanly onto enrolment.  We address this latter issue by estimating and 
utilizing county-specific eligibility thresholds (and by controlling for other criteria used 
idiosyncratically for SR enrollment). 
 
3. Changes in Incentives under the SR 
3.1 The SR’s Supply-Side Incentives 
In our analyses of the SR, we emphasize insurers’ ability to contract with health care 
providers (hospitals and medical groups) for more efficient service use as the principal 
innovation.  Insurers receive premiums (flat payments per enrollee per unit time) for all covered 
services, giving them strong incentives to constrain total spending.  Insurers participating in the 
SR then transmit these incentives to provider organizations (hospitals and clinics) through high-
powered contracts and the authority to deny coverage for services deemed inefficient.
15 
Specifically, there are two types of contracts between insurers and provider organizations 
under the SR: capitated primary care contracts and fee-for-service specialty care contracts.  For 
primary care, insurers pay organizations fixed amounts per month for all services used by 
enrollees (“capitation”).  These contracts create strong incentives for organizations to constrain 
total spending on primary care and have important implications for both preventive and curative 
health care (as discussed in the next section).  Importantly, promotion of preventive care can be a 
central means of reducing total primary care expenditures.  For specialty care, insurers pay 
                                                 
15 Provider organizations, in turn, must transmit the incentives they face to individual clinicians whom they employ.  
Our interviews with stakeholders in the Colombian health care system suggest that organizations solve this agency 
problem through non-financial rather than payment-based incentives (systematic data on organizational incentives 
and clinician contracts is unavailable).   9
provider organizations a pre-determined fee for each covered service that they supply (i.e., on a 
“fee-for-service” basis).  These contracts encourage the provision of all reimbursable services 
(both efficient and inefficient).  However, SR insurers also have the authority to deny coverage 
on a case-by-case basis for inefficient specialty care (termed “utilization review”), allowing them 
to limit wasteful service use.
16 
 
3.2 The Interaction of Supply- and Demand-Side Incentives and Empirical Predictions  
Although changes in supply-side incentives are the salient feature of the SR, out-of-
pocket prices for covered services also fall.  This section therefore considers the joint effect of 
supply- and demand-side changes in formulating predictions about changes in risk protection, the 
use of preventive and curative services, and health outcomes.  Section 5 then provides empirical 
evidence on each. 
Risk Protection and Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending.  Protecting households against 
medical care costs associated with unexpected illness is the primary purpose of health insurance.  
As Appendix 1 shows, the SR covers many of the most expensive services including trauma 
care, dialysis, and major joint replacement (hips and knees, for example).  It also caps total out-
of-pocket spending per episode of illness each year at half of the monthly minimum wage.  The 
SR should therefore reduce the variance of medical care spending relative to the mean as it 
reduces the probability of large right-tail outliers in the distribution of medical spending.  
Assuming that the price elasticity of demand for catastrophic services is less than one, the SR 
should also reduce total out-of-pocket spending for medical care. 
Preventive Health Services.  Most preventive services in Colombia are free regardless of 
insurance status (i.e., free both for SR enrollees and the uninsured), so the main difference in 
                                                 
16 Utilization review does little to promote services traditionally used sub-optimally.   10
incentives for preventive care originate on the supply-side.  Preventive services are categorized 
as primary care, and because primary care providers are paid on a capitated basis, they have 
strong incentives to limit total primary care spending.  Increasing preventive service use can 
reduce the need for more costly curative care – and therefore be cost-saving – so capitated 
primary care incentives are likely to increase preventive care.
17  An opposing force at work is ex 
ante moral hazard: SR enrollees may have weaker incentives to use preventive services because 
they pay less for curative care (Nordquist and Wu 1976, Phelps 1978).  Although we fail to find 
evidence of ex ante moral hazard (as shown in Section 5.4) and there is little evidence of it in 
other studies (Kenkel 2000), our preventive care estimates reflect the net effect of these forces.
18  
Because preventive services generate important positive externalities (both pecuniary and 
infectious disease-related), increases in their use presumably improve welfare.
19     
Curative Medical Care.  Three changes under the SR are likely to influence the use of 
curative medical care: reductions in out-of-pocket prices, increases in the use of preventive 
services, and supply-side incentives for limiting total medical spending.  First, for negative price 
elasticities of demand, reductions in out-of-pocket prices will increase the use of curative care.  
This increase is inefficient under standard assumptions (ex post moral hazard); however, curative 
care in developing countries may produce positive externalities, and there may also be important 
credit constraints.  Second, any increases in preventive service use may reduce the use of 
curative care (an efficient result).  Third, both capitation and utilization review produce 
                                                 
17 The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse 1993) found that enrollees in health maintenance 
organizations (or HMOs, which employ capitation) used relatively more preventive care. More recent observational 
studies in the United States report congruent results (Keenan, Elliott, Cleary, Zaslavsky, and Landon 2009). 
18 The RAND Health Insurance Experiment reports no sizeable or significant effect of insurance coverage on health 
behaviors (smoking, drinking, and exercise) (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993).  Medicare 
coverage has also been reported not to increase unhealthy behaviors (Dave and Kaestner 2006). 
19 Popular conditional cash transfer programs – including the Familias en Acción program in Colombia – aim to 
increase the use of preventive services even though they are otherwise available for free.  At least eleven developing 
countries have introduced such conditional cash transfer programs (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).   11
incentives for providers to limit the use of curative medical care.  Some reductions may be 
efficient (counterbalancing demand-side incentives leading to ex post moral hazard) while others 
may be inefficient (leading to “stinting” – see for example Ellis and McGuire (1990), Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991), Ma and McGuire (1997), and McGuire (2000)).  Predictions about changes 
in curative care under the SR as well as their welfare implications are therefore ambiguous. 
Health Outcomes.  Both preventive and curative services are inputs into health 
production, so changes in health under the SR will depend on the precise pattern of changes in 
their use.  However, if one considers preventive care to influence health on the extensive margin 
(whether or not an individual becomes sick) and curative care to influence health on the intensive 
margin (duration or severity of illness conditional on becoming sick), it is reasonable to believe 
that preventive care have larger health consequences than curative care.  In our empirical 
analyses, we are also able to examine specific illnesses linked to types of preventive service use 
that we observe. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Data 
Our empirical approach requires household survey data containing three types of 
information: (1) enrollment in the SR, (2) components of the SISBEN index (enabling us to 
simulate SR eligibility), and (3) potential behavioral responses and outcomes of interest (both 
welfare-improving and distortionary).  There are two candidate Colombian household surveys 
that meet these criteria: the Encuestas de Calidad de Vida (ECV) and the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS).
20  The ECVs are nationally-representative household surveys designed to 
                                                 
20 Official SISBEN classification data (used for eligibility determination) do not contain outcomes of interest and are 
unattractive for our purposes given manipulation evidence of manipulation (Camacho and Conover 2009).   12
measure socio-economic well-being and “quality of life,” broadly defined.  The DHS data 
reports detailed fertility, health, and socio-economic information for nationally-representative 
samples of fertile age women (defined as ages 15-49) and their households.  Because the de facto 
implementation of the SR occurred in 1996/1997, we use the 2003 ECV and the 2005 DHS for 
our analyses.
21  Table 1 shows descriptive statistics by type of behavior/outcome for the full 
samples as well as those with and without SR coverage. 
As our empirical strategy requires, we calculate household-level SISBEN scores to 
simulate SR eligibility because simulated eligibility should not reflect misrepresentation of 
household characteristics as official SISBEN scores do (Camacho and Conover 2009).  However, 
not all household surveys contain all necessary components of the SISBEN index.  Appendix 2 
provides a complete description of the SISBEN components present in each survey.
22  We 
impute values using ordered probit models for the few variables that are missing.  
 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
Instrumenting for Enrollment with Simulated Eligibility 
In principle, the SISBEN index’s SR eligibility threshold (at score 48 in urban areas) can 
be used to study behavioral responses associated with SR enrollment.  This discontinuity induces 
an abrupt shift in eligibility (and enrollment) along otherwise smooth distributions of household 
characteristics; coincident shifts in behaviors and outcomes can reasonably be linked to the 
program.  However, selection into eligibility (and enrollment) according to unobserved 
                                                 
21 There was also a Colombian DHS survey conducted in 2000, but it is much smaller and contains few outcome 
variables of interest.  We do not use the 1997 wave of the ECV because SR enrollment was still very low in that 
year. 
22 In theory, SISBEN scores should be calculated at the family (or “nucleus”) level.  However, we treat entire 
households as families given reports that SISBEN enumerators adopted this definition in practice due to difficulties 
in conforming to the technical definition.   13
household characteristics as discussed in Section 2.3 is likely to bias the estimates of interest 
(McCrary 2008). 
To circumvent this difficulty, we employ an instrumental variables strategy closely 
resembling one proposed by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001).  Conceptually, we seek to 
reconstruct ‘true’ SISBEN scores when both official SISBEN scores and observed SR enrollment 
reflect manipulation.  To do so, we calculate SISBEN scores for each household in the ECV and 
DHS data and then use calculated scores to instrument for SR enrollment (for prominent 
examples of simulated instruments, see Currie and Gruber (1996), and Cutler and Gruber (1996), 
and Hoxby (2001)).
23  A virtue of this approach is that neither ECV nor DHS data is used for 
eligibility determinations.   
Using urban households with simulated SISBEN scores near the urban eligibility 
threshold,
24 we could in principle begin by estimating the following first-stage equation for 
individuals i in household h: 
(1)  enrollih = α + γbelowh + βSISBENh + Σkδkestratohk + εih, 
where enroll is an indicator for whether or not household i is enrolled in the SR, below is an 
indicator for simulated SISBEN score lying below the eligibility threshold, SISBEN is simulated 
SISBEN score, and estrato is a dummy variable for an estrato category.  Using Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS), we could then estimate the following second-stage equation: 
 (2)  outcomeih = φ + λenrollih + θSISBENh + Σkπkestratohk + ξih, 
instrumeting for enroll with below.  The relationship between behavioral outcomes of interest 
(outcome) and SR enrollment would then be captured by estimates of the parameter λ.   
                                                 
23 We emphasize “old” SISBEN scores – those calculated using the official scale in effect between the beginning of 
the SR and 2003.  Enrollees eligible only under the old scale were not disenrolled with the introduction of the “new 
scale,” and the old (but not the new) eligibility discontinuity is evident in the 2005 DHS. 
24 We do not use rural households to examine the rural threshold between SISBEN strata 2 and 3 because of 
inconsistent application of the rural scale.   14
Estimating County-Specific Eligibility Thresholds 
  As described in Section 2.3, financial shortfalls led many Colombian counties to use SR 
eligibility thresholds at SISBEN scores below the official national threshold.
25  The implication 
of this for estimating equations (1) and (2) using the official threshold is that our first stage 
relationship will be weaker than necessary, compounding limitations to first stage strength posed 
by the other issues raised in Section 2.3.  We therefore use county-specific eligibility thresholds.  
In addition to improving the strength of our first stage, this approach offers another key benefit: 
because some local governments use the official national threshold for other public benefits, 
changes in outcomes observed at county-specific SR thresholds will not reflect behavioral 
responses to other public programs.  (Section 5.5 shows that participation in other public 
programs is not discontinuous at county-specific thresholds.) 
Exact county-specific eligibility thresholds are unknown, so we estimate them following 
Chay, McEwan, and Urquiola (2005).  Specifically, using our full samples, we establish county-
specific breaks in SR eligibility at the SISBEN score that maximize the goodness-of-fit of a 
model of SR enrollment as a function of a dichotomous indicator for whether or not a 
household’s score falls below the threshold.
26  This approach establishes thresholds that 
maximize the percentage of individuals correctly classified as eligible in each county.  
We then use county-specific thresholds to re-code the variable below for each individual i 
in households h and Colombian counties c and estimate the following first stage equation: 
                                                 
25 Bogotá adopted a threshold above the uniform national one, first using SISBEN score 50 and later SISBEN score 
52. 
26 We also constrain estimated thresholds to fall below the uniform national threshold (given that our measure of SR 
enrollment reflects both true eligibility and manipulation), and we exclude individuals from a few counties using 
two criteria related to having very few observations in some counties.  One is having the first percentile in the 
SISBEN score distribution lie above the national threshold or the 99
th percentile score lie below the national 
threshold.  The other is having an estimated threshold with those below it having relatively lower SR enrollment 
rates than those above it.  The total number of observations excluded for these reasons is minor (3.8% of the sample 
in the ECV data and 5% of the sample in the DHS data).  The mean threshold in the ECV sample is 45 with a 
standard deviation of 4.25; the DHS sample mean is the same but with a smaller standard deviation (3.26).   15
(3)  enrollihc = α + γbelowhc + βSISBENh + φSISBEN_diffhc + Σkδkestratohk + μc + εihc, 
where below is now an indicator for whether or not individual i’s simulated SISBEN score falls 
below the eligibility threshold in the individual’s county c, SISBEN_diff is the difference 
between an individual’s simulated SISBEN score and the estimated eligibility threshold in the 
individual’s county (i.e., relative SISBEN score), μc represents county fixed effects (allowing us 
to focus on within-county variation in simulated eligibility across county-specific thresholds), 
and all other variables are defined as in equation (1).  To adhere transparently to the identifying 
assumption that individuals with simulated SISBEN scores very near the threshold are 
comparable with the exception of their eligibility, we conservatively focus on individuals whose 
calculated scores lie within two index points of the county-specific cutoff (our main estimates 
persist across various bandwidths, as shown in Section 5.5).
27 
Figure 1 uses ECV and DHS data to show SR enrollment and “uninsurance” by simulated 
SISBEN score relative to county-specific eligibility thresholds.  Each county’s threshold is 
normalized to zero, and the figure then shows means and 95% confidence intervals for each 
SISBEN index integer relative to the threshold as well as non-parametric kernel density plots on 
either side.  The figure illustrates large discrete increases in the probability of enrollment and 
concomitant decreases in the probability of uninsurance at the threshold ranging between 25 to 
30 percentage points.   
Using our re-coded variable below to instrument for enroll, we then estimate the 
following equation by 2SLS: 
(4)  outcomeihc = φ + λenrollihc + θSISBENh + ψSISBEN_diffhc + Σkπkestratohk + μc + ξihc, 
                                                 
27 Because eligibility thresholds vary by county, our approach essentially averages across sample respondents with 
different absolute SISBEN scores.  To investigate how our estimates vary with absolute SISBEN score, we also 
estimate variants of equation (4) below with interactions between SR enrollment and absolute SISBEN score 
(instrumenting for this term with interactions between an indicator for falling below county-specific thresholds and 
absolute SISBEN score) and find insignificant estimates for this interaction term.   16
where the estimate of interest is the estimate of λ.
28 Section 5.5 shows that our results are robust 
across bandwidths to including higher-order relative SISBEN score polynomials, using 
interactions between relative SISBEN scores and simulated eligibility, and excluding county 
fixed effects.  We also estimate λ using local linear regression without any covariates other than 
relative SISBEN score. 
 
5. Results 
This section presents empirical evidence on a variety of important behavioral responses 
to the SR.  We begin by investigating the effectiveness of health insurance in accomplishing its 
primary objective: protecting households against financial risk (and possibly changing the 
optimal composition of household spending and assets).  Next, we study changes in the use of 
traditionally under-utilized preventive services in light of the SR’s emphasis on allocative 
efficiency.  In doing so, we also examine changes in health outcomes that are sensitive to the use 
of important preventive services.   We then analyze how SR enrollment is related to changes in 
the use of curative medicine.  To investigate possible behavioral distortions, we also test for 
reductions in private health investments associated with SR enrollment (ex ante moral hazard) 
and insurance ‘crowd-out.’  Finally we present evidence on the validity of our empirical strategy 
and show that our estimates are generally robust across a number of parametric and non-
parametric specifications. 
 
5.1 Financial Risk Protection and Portfolio Choice 
                                                 
28 We estimate equations (3) and (4) using linear models; marginal probabilities computed using bivariate probit 
models yield similar results to the 2SLS estimates for dichotomous outcomes examined throughout the paper.  We 
calculate our standard errors by relaxing the assumption that disturbance terms are independent and identically-
distributed within households, the level at which the treatment of interest (eligibility based on the SISBEN index) is 
assigned.   17
Although a key innovation of the SR is its emphasis on allocative efficiency, the primary 
objective of health insurance is to provide protection against financial risk.   We therefore begin 
by investigating the relationship between SR enrollment and both the level and variability of out-
of-pocket medical spending.  To construct our variability measure, we first calculate mean 
individual spending separately among those enrolled and those not enrolled in the SR.  For each 
individual, we then measure the difference between individual spending and the mean among 
those with the same enrollment status.  Our variability measure is then the absolute value of this 
difference.  We analyze outpatient and inpatient spending (within the past twelve months) 
separately and emphasize the latter because of idiosyncrasies in how outpatient spending is 
reported.
29 
We first graphically examine shifts in the distribution of medical spending associated 
with simulated eligibility for the SR.  Panel A of Figure 2 shows the distribution of outpatient 
medical spending in the preceding month separately for those falling above and those falling 
below county-specific thresholds (using our sample of those within two index points of the 
cutoff).  Both distributions are heavily right-skewed, but mass in the distribution for those who 
are eligible (those below the threshold) falls to the left of the distribution for those who are 
ineligible.  Panel B shows the difference between the two distributions (density among those 
below the threshold minus density among those above the threshold at every level of spending), 
confirming this result.  Figure 3 then shows the same distributions for inpatient spending in the 
past year; there is again more mass at greater spending values (between 300,000 and 400,000 
pesos in particular) among the ineligibles.  Both figures suggest that SR eligibility is associated 
with reductions in right-tail medical spending – a pattern consistent with risk protection.  
                                                 
29 The ECV 2003 question about outpatient spending in the preceding 30 days excludes outpatient costs associated 
with illness ultimately leading to hospitalization; the inpatient expenditure question asks about all inpatient spending 
in the past 12 months.   18
The first four columns of Panel A in Table 2 then present econometric results obtained by 
estimating equations (3) and (4) for the level and variability of medical spending by type.  The 
first row presents IV estimates for SR enrollment, and the second row reports intent-to-treat 
(ITT) estimates for simulated SR eligibility (estimates for a dummy variable coding whether or 
not an individual falls below the eligibility threshold obtained by OLS regressions of outcomes 
on this dummy and the other covariates in equation 4).  The first column suggests that SR 
enrollment lowers mean inpatient spending by about 60,000 pesos, a 31% reduction among those 
using any inpatient services (Table 4 suggests no selection into inpatient service use associated 
with SR enrollment).  Perhaps more importantly, consistent with insurance through the SR 
reigning-in large outliers in the right-skewed distribution of medical spending, the variability of 
inpatient spending fell by roughly 62,000 pesos, a reduction of 34%.
30  (Despite suggestive 
evidence in Figure 2, our estimates for level and variability of outpatient spending are 
statistically insignificant.)  To further probe the association between SR enrollment and 
protection against catastrophic medical care costs, columns 5 through 7 show estimates obtained 
by using dichotomous indicators for inpatient spending exceeding 600,000, 900,000, and 
1,200,000 pesos as dependent variables.  The resulting estimates suggest that outlier inpatient 
spending falls by 3, 2, and 2 percentage points (respectively) with SR enrollment.  Appendix 3 
Figure 1 graphically shows all outcomes examined in Panel A across county-specific eligibility 
thresholds (essentially, graphical versions of our intent-to-treat analyses). 
Overall, the results shown in the top panel of Table 2 suggest that SR enrollment is 
associated with meaningful risk protection benefits.  By reducing household exposure to 
financial risk, SR enrollment could also produce meaningful changes in the composition of 
                                                 
30 Using the estimates in Panel A of Table 2 and mean inpatient spending and mean inpatient variability among 
those in our bandwidth of 2 sample enrolled in the SR, 60,371/194,858≈0.31 and 62,109/185,424≈0.34.   19
household assets, human capital investments, and household consumption (i.e., portfolio choice 
effects).  Specifically, it may increase investments not previously undertaken because of costly 
informal risk-management activities (such as precautionary saving).  Panel B of Table 2 presents 
estimates for durable goods not used to construct the SISBEN index (car and radio ownership) as 
well as household education and consumption expenditures.  In general, it implies that SR 
enrollment is not associated with discernable portfolio choice effects (perhaps because the SR 
falls short of providing full insurance).
31 
 
5.2 Preventive Service Use and Health Status 
In addition to providing protection against financial risk, the twin objective of the SR is 
to improve allocative efficiency in medical care.  In particular, increasing the use of highly 
beneficial preventive services – many of which produce large positive externalities – is likely to 
improve welfare.  These externalities are due both to reduced rates of infectious disease 
transmission and to reduced curative care costs borne by others through risk pools.  Because 
preventive services are generally free for Colombians regardless of their insurance status, 
changes in use must necessarily reflect high-powered supply-side incentives (capitation in 
particular) under the SR. 
The first two columns of Table 3 report estimates for different types of preventive care 
use obtained from equations (3) and (4) (Appendix 3 Figure 2 shows graphical versions of the 
intent-to-treat analyses).  In general, they suggest substantial increases in the use of preventive 
                                                 
31 In our robustness tables (Appendix 4, Table A1 – described in Section 5.5), however, we find evidence of 
statistically significant increases in car and radio ownership when estimating equations (3) and (4) using bandwidths 
of 3 and 4 SISBEN index units.   20
health care services.
32  Specifically, SR enrollment is associated with a 29 percentage point 
increase in the probability of a preventive physician visit in the past year (a 50% increase).  
Importantly, children enrolled in the SR also had 1.24 more growth-monitoring and well-care 
visits in the past year than their uninsured peers, an increase of nearly twofold.  These well-care 
visits are a principal way of addressing important childhood health problems including iron 
deficiency anemia and other micronutrient deficiencies.  Corrective action is a key way to 
strengthen immune system function and reduce vulnerability to leading childhood illnesses such 
as diarrheal diseases and acute respiratory infections (Fogel 1994).
33 
We then investigate whether or not health status has improved under the SR – in 
particular, dimensions of health that are sensitive to the use of preventive care (which we 
conceptualize as influencing the extrinsic margin of illness incidence rather than the intrinsic 
margin of duration or severity).  Although our preventive physician visit variable is not service-
specific, our measure of childhood growth and development checks should correspond directly 
with infectious disease incidence.  Columns three through six of Table 3 show estimates for child 
health outcomes linked to preventive care use.  SR enrollment is associated with 1.3 fewer child 
days absent from usual activities due to illness in the past month.  Moreover, enrollment is also 
associated with a 35 percentage point reduction in the self-reported incidence of cough, fever, or 
diarrhea among children in the preceding two weeks (a 62% reduction).    Appendix 3 Figure 2 
shows graphical versions of the intent-to-treat analyses for these health outcomes as well.  
Because these health gains can be linked to increases in preventive service use, they are also 
likely to improve welfare. 
                                                 
32 This increase in preventive care use dominates any ex ante moral hazard (which would reduce prevention – 
although Section 5.4 suggests no evidence of ex ante moral hazard). 
33 For more information about Colombia’s growth monitoring and well-care programs (which include the provision 
of iron supplements and de-worming medication as well as nutrition education and supervision), see 
http://www.minproteccionsocial.gov.co/vbecontent/library/documents/DocNewsNo16062DocumentNo4071.PDF.   21
5.3 Use of Curative Medical Care 
  As Section 3.2 discusses, there are a variety of competing incentives and other forces 
influencing curative medical care under the SR.  These include reductions in out-of-pocket 
prices, increases in the use of preventive services, and supply-side incentives for limiting total 
medical spending.  Predictions about changes in curative service use under the SR – and their 
welfare implications – are therefore ambiguous, but they remain a central interest of 
policymakers and are important for assessing the costs of Colombia’s innovative health 
insurance reform. 
Table 4 reports estimates for various categories of curative care obtained from equations 
(3) and (4) (Appendix 3 Figure 3 shows graphical versions of the intent-to-treat analyses).  We 
find that SR enrollment is associated with a 13 percentage point increase in physician visits 
because of health problems within the past 30 days.  There is no change in use of curative care 
among children, which may be due to improvements in child health associated with SR 
enrollment.  Finally, there is no meaningful relationship at conventional significance levels 
between participation in the SR and hospitalizations or medical visits for chronic diseases. 
 
5.4 Ex Ante Moral Hazard and Insurance Crowd-Out 
Protection from financial risk associated with unexpected illness weakens private 
incentives for costly health protection (ex ante moral hazard) (Pauly 1968).  Because we find 
evidence of greater risk protection, we investigate how protective private health behaviors not 
directly linked to medical care change with SR enrollment.
34  As Table 5 and Appendix 3 Figure 
                                                 
34 More generally, private health behaviors and public health services could theoretically be either complements or 
substitutes for publicly provided health services.  While reductions in the price of medical care may raise the return 
to private health investments given competing risks, cheaper health services could also instead ‘crowd-out’ costly 
private health behaviors (Dow, Holmes, Philipson, and Sala-i-Martin 1999, Murphy and Topel 2003).   22
4 show, however, we find no meaningful change in handwashing, breastfeeding, or maternal 
investments in fetal health (alcohol, drug, or tobacco use during pregnancy; or prenatal dietary 
supplementation with iron, calcium, or folic acid), suggesting little ex ante moral hazard 
associated with SR enrollment. 
Manipulation of official SISBEN scores suggests that Colombians perceive benefits of 
SR enrollment, so we also investigate the possibility that SR enrollment displaces other forms of 
explicit health insurance.
35  Table 5 also presents intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates obtained by 
estimating equation (3) with dichotomous indicators for Regimen Contributivo enrollment, other 
forms of health insurance (those for the military, police officers, and certain industrial groups 
like oil industry workers, for example), and “uninsurance” as dependent variables.  The estimates 
for Regimen Contributivo and other insurance are generally small and not statistically 
meaningful, suggesting that the SR does not generally “crowd-out” other forms of insurance (and 
that our comparisons throughout the paper are truly between SR enrollees and the “uninsured”). 
 
5.5 Balance across Discontinuities and Robustness 
Our interpretation of the results above requires that absent the SR, eligible and ineligible 
individuals (according to our simulated SISBEN scores) in the vicinity of each county’s 
threshold are comparable.  To probe this assumption further, Table 6 first presents results 
obtained by estimating equations (3) and (4) for individual characteristics that could not 
reasonably change in response to SR enrollment (such as age or educational attainment for 
                                                 
35 Formal sector employees are mandated to enroll in an employment-based health insurance system called Regimen 
Contributivo.  This mandate holds even for individuals with SISBEN scores falling below the SISBEN eligibility 
threshold for the SR.   23
adults). Consistent with our assumption, we generally find no estimates that are meaningfully 
different from zero.
36 
Next, we consider whether or not our SR enrollment estimates might be attributable to 
participation in other public programs for which some counties also use the SISBEN index.   
Before investigating this possibility directly, we first note that it is doubtful because these 
programs use the uniform national eligibility threshold, while we estimate and utilize de facto 
county-specific thresholds for the SR – many of which fall below the uniform national threshold.  
To confirm this, we re-estimate equations (3) and (4) using a dichotomous indicator for 
participation in these other programs as the dependent variable in equation (4).  We analyze 
participation in a wide range of publicly financed programs, including job training, home 
mortgage subsidies, education vouchers, Hogares Comunitarios (a large child care program), and 
services provided by the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (the largest social welfare 
agency in Colombia).
37  Table 6 presents these results, suggesting that participation in other 
programs is balanced across county-specific SR eligibility thresholds. 
Finally, to investigate the robustness of our results, we estimate a variety of alternative 
parametric and non-parametric specifications based on our main estimating equations.  First, we 
re-estimate equations (3) and (4) using SISBEN score bandwidths ranging between two and four.  
Second, at each bandwidth we estimate specifications that include higher order polynomials of 
relative SISBEN scores (including squared, cubic, and fourth power terms) as well as models 
                                                 
36 The single exception is whether or not the household head completed elementary education at the 10% level (and 
in the 2003 ECV, but not the 2005 DHS) and if anything would suggest our results to be slight underestimates. 
37 The program Empleo en Acción (a workfare program active in 2003 but abolished in 2004) is the only public 
program of which we are aware that used the uniform national SISBEN eligibility threshold for which the 2003 
ECV does not contain data.  Participation in the program was low (only 7.4% of those in SISBEN strata 1 or 2) and 
provided no benefits directly related to health (it paid 60% of the minimum wage to individuals who worked on 
official program projects an average of at least 30 hours per week for 2.4 months) (IFS-SEI-Econometria 2005).  We 
do not have information about participation in Familias en Acción, a Colombian conditional cash transfer program, 
but the eligibility threshold for this program (36) is considerably lower, falling more than two standard deviations 
below the mean of our estimated SR thresholds.   24
that include interactions between relative SISBEN scores and simulated eligibility (although 
allowing SISBEN gradients to vary on either side of the eligibility threshold should matter little 
given our narrow bandwidth).  Third, we re-estimate specifications that do not include county 
fixed effects (at each bandwidth), allowing us also to make cross-county comparisons among 
individuals with identical simulated SISBEN scores but that fall on opposite sides of county-
specific eligibility thresholds.  Finally, we also estimate models using non-parametric local linear 
regression.
38 As Tables A1-A4 of Appendix 4 suggest, our results are generally robust (with 
some variation in precision) across these alternative bandwidths and specifications. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Distinct from traditional analyses of health insurance in wealthy countries (and standard 
concerns about ex post moral hazard), under-use and misuse are particularly important sources of 
inefficiency in developing country medical care.  This paper presents new evidence that the SR 
has successfully protected poor Colombians against financial risk while also addressing these 
inefficiencies in health service use.  Specifically, the SR has successfully increased the use of 
key preventive services with large positive externalities through high-powered contracting with 
medical care providers.  We find evidence of health improvement under the SR as well – in 
particular, gains that can be linked to the increases in preventive care that we observe.  This 
approach to strengthening supply-side incentives for the provision of key preventive services 
warrants further research because it may be a potent alternative (or perhaps an effective 
                                                 
38 Specifically, we use local linear regression functions with triangle kernels to estimate conditional means of 
outcome variables (conditioning on SISBEN_diff) on either side of the eligibility threshold, and we repeat this 
estimation process for enrollment in the SR.  We then construct Wald statistics using differences in the estimated 
conditional means of the outcome variable on either side of the threshold as numerators and the difference in the 
conditional mean of SR enrollment on either side of the threshold as the denominator.  We estimate our standard 
errors using 250 bootstrap replications.  Details of the implementation can be found in Nichols (2007).   25
complement) to common demand-side approaches embodied in conditional cash transfer 
programs. 
We conclude by observing that the welfare-improving potential of high-powered 
incentives in health insurance has yet to be fully realized.  In the specific context of Colombia, a 
variety of political concessions followed the creation of the SR – including exemptions from the 
end of government subsidies as well as requirements that insurers contract with public facilities 
for a minimum share of the services that they finance.  These concessions have presumably 
limited the ability of health plans to pay medical care providers in ways that encourage better 
quality and lower cost services.  More generally, the performance of contracts that explicitly 
reward health improvement has yet to be assessed.    26
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Figure 1: Subsidized Regime Enrollment
and 'Uninsurance' across SISBEN Eligibility Thresholds
 
 
Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-
specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Each point (and 
corresponding 95% confidence interval bars) represents means for individuals grouped 
into half-integer bins relative to county-specific thresholds.  Non-parametric kernel 
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Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific 
eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV  The top panel shows non-parametric kernel density 
plots fitted separately using individuals on either side of county-specific thresholds; the bottom 
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Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific 
eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV  The top panel shows non-parametric kernel density 
plots fitted separately using individuals on either side of county-specific thresholds; the bottom 
panel shows the difference between the two plots. Variable: Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Data Source
Risk Protection, Consumption Smoothing, and Portfolio Choice
Individual Inpatient Medical Spending 10,577 129,443 4,211 10,971 128,490 2,248 10,125 130,558 1,963 ECV
Individual Outpatient Medical Spending 2,118 22,565 4,218 2,513 20,170 2,249 1,666 25,019 1,969 ECV
Variability of Individual Inpatient Medical Spending 20,167 127,861 4,211 20,983 126,764 2,248 19,234 129,133 1,963 ECV
Variability of Individual Outpatient Medical Spending 3,971 22,209 4,218 4,698 19,615 2,249 3,140 24,822 1,969 ECV
Individual Inpatient Medical Spending >= 600,000 0.004 0.06 4,211 0.004 0.06 2,248 0.004 0.06 1,963 ECV
Individual Inpatient Medical Spending >=900,000 0.002 0.04 4,211 0.002 0.04 2,248 0.002 0.04 1,963 ECV
Individual Inpatient Medical Spending >= 1,200,000 0.001 0.04 4,211 0.001 0.04 2,248 0.002 0.04 1,963 ECV
Individual Education Spending 7,588 20,279 3,567 7,501 23,234 1,874 7,684 16,407 1,693 ECV
Household Education Spending 35,145 48,468 4,222 34,089 52,464 2,253 36,352 43,428 1,969 ECV
Total Spending on Food 274,881 217,392 4,096 279,128 201,735 2,171 270,091 233,756 1,925 ECV
Total Monthly Expenditure 654,552 599,861 966 688,065 716,382 479 621,590 455,559 487 ECV
Has Car 0.03 0.16 3,276 0.03 0.17 1,676 0.02 0.15 1,600 DHS
Has Radio 0.60 0.49 3,276 0.60 0.49 1,676 0.61 0.49 1,600 DHS
Medical Care Use
Preventive Physician Visit 0.47 0.50 4,222 0.39 0.49 2,253 0.57 0.49 1,969 ECV
Number of Growth Development Checks Last Year 1.17 1.85 1,186 0.96 1.75 678 1.45 1.93 508 DHS
Curative Care Use (Not Conditional on Health Status) 0.06 0.24 4,222 0.06 0.23 2,253 0.07 0.26 1,969 ECV
Hospital Stay 0.08 0.26 4,222 0.07 0.25 2,253 0.08 0.28 1,969 ECV
Medical Visit for Chronic Disease 0.58 0.49 564 0.52 0.50 262 0.64 0.48 302 ECV
Curative Care Use among Children (Not Conditional on Health Status) 0.32 0.46 1,184 0.29 0.46 678 0.34 0.47 506 DHS
Health Status
Child Days Lost to Illness 0.59 1.96 1,184 0.67 2.21 678 0.49 1.57 506 DHS
Cough, Fever Diarrhea 0.56 0.50 1,188 0.56 0.50 679 0.57 0.50 509 DHS
Any Health Problem 0.64 0.48 1,184 0.63 0.48 678 0.65 0.48 506 DHS
Birthweight (KG) 3.26 0.56 901 3.23 0.52 527 3.28 0.61 374 DHS
Behavioral Distortions
Drank Alcohol during Pregnancy 0.11 0.31 1,013 0.12 0.33 500 0.10 0.29 513 DHS
Number of Drinks per Week during Pregnancy 3.59 11.70 109 3.68 12.40 60 3.47 10.91 49 DHS
Months Child Breastfed 12.41 10.57 962 11.11 10.21 572 14.32 10.81 390 DHS
Folic Acid During Pregnancy 0.55 0.50 1,003 0.55 0.50 495 0.55 0.50 508 DHS
Number Months Folic Acid during Pregnancy 4.03 2.45 528 4.10 2.41 260 3.97 2.49 268 DHS
Handwashing 0.60 0.49 652 0.52 0.50 406 0.72 0.45 246 DHS
Contributory Regime Enrollment 0.09 0.29 4,222 0.17 0.38 2,253 0.00 0.00 1,969 ECV
Other Health Insurance 0.00 0.06 4,222 0.01 0.08 2,253 0.00 0.00 1,969 ECV
Uninsured 0.44 0.50 4,222 0.82 0.39 2,253 0.00 0.00 1,969 ECV
Contributory Regime Enrollment 0.12 0.33 3,276 0.24 0.43 1,676 0.00 0.00 1,600 DHS
Other Health Insurance 0.01 0.08 3,276 0.01 0.11 1,676 0.00 0.00 1,600 DHS
Uninsured 0.38 0.49 3,276 0.74 0.44 1,676 0.00 0.00 1,600 DHS
Balance
Household Head Age 46.79 14.74 3,276 47.25 15.28 1,676 46.31 14.14 1,600 DHS
Household Head Age 46.58 14.79 4,222 45.71 15.12 2,253 47.57 14.35 1,969 ECV
Completed Elementary School 0.19 0.39 3,275 0.18 0.38 1,675 0.20 0.40 1,600 DHS
Completed Elementary School 0.19 0.39 3,764 0.18 0.39 1,985 0.19 0.39 1,779 ECV
Completed Secondary School 0.19 0.39 3,275 0.20 0.40 1,675 0.18 0.39 1,600 DHS
Completed Secondary School 0.07 0.26 3,764 0.08 0.27 1,985 0.07 0.25 1,779 ECV
Household Head Completed Elementary School 0.29 0.45 3,276 0.28 0.45 1,676 0.31 0.46 1,600 DHS
Household Head Completed Elementary School 0.28 0.45 4,222 0.27 0.45 2,253 0.28 0.45 1,969 ECV
Household Head Completed Secondary School 0.02 0.15 3,276 0.02 0.13 1,676 0.03 0.16 1,600 DHS
Household Head Completed Secondary School
Student Received School Grant 0.08 0.26 1,305 0.05 0.22 651 0.10 0.30 654 ECV
Benefits to Buy House 0.01 0.08 4,222 0.00 0.06 2,253 0.01 0.10 1,969 ECV
Attended Training 0.05 0.21 3,010 0.06 0.23 1,593 0.04 0.19 1,417 ECV
Household in Hogar Comunitario program 0.10 0.30 4,222 0.09 0.29 2,253 0.11 0.31 1,969 ECV
Services from Bienstar Familiar 0.18 0.38 4,222 0.16 0.37 2,253 0.20 0.40 1,969 ECV
All data summarized is from samples of "urban" individuals within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds in either the 2003  Encuesta de Calidad de Vida  (ECV) or the 2005 Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) (as indicated in the right column). SISBEN index calculations are described in detail in Appendix 2, and estimation of county-specific eligibility thresholds is presented in Section 4.2.  The first group of three columns present
summary statistics for the entire bandwidth of 2 sample, the second group for those not enrolled in the Subsidized Regime, and the third group for those enrolled in the Subsidized Regime.
Not Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime Total
TABLE 1:

































Spending      
≥ 1,200,000
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment -60,371* 3,562 -62,109* 2,620 -0.03* -0.02** -0.02**
(33,166) (3,307) (32,860) (3,160) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intent to Treat Estimate -15,628* 918 -16,078** 676 -0.01** -0.004*** -0.003***
(8,138) (827) (8,046) (793) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
First Stage F-Statistic 25.75 25.53 25.75 25.53 25.75 25.75 25.75
Observations 4,211 4,218 4,211 4,218 4,211 4,211 4,211
Data Source ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV












Has Car Has Radio
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment -342 30,366 32,136 -33,826 0.07 0.14
(4,963) (25,733) (104,871) (305,878) (0.04) (0.11)
Intent to Treat Estimate -84.72 7,815 8,790 -14,036 0.03* 0.05
(1,230) (6,412) (28,271) (127,170) (0.02) (0.04)
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
First Stage F-Statistic 23.16 25.45 27.82 13.53 110 110
Observations 3,567 4,222 4,096 966 3,276 3,276
Data Source ECV ECV ECV ECV DHS DHS
Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables
are shown at the top of each column.  The first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated
eligibility.  The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold; for dichotomous
dependent variables, marginal probabilities obtained from probit estimates calculated at the mean of the independent variables are reported .  The third row shows first stage
estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold.  All specifications also include
SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard errors (clustered by household) are shown in
parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
TABLE 2:





















2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment 0.29* 1.24* -1.30* -0.35* -0.26 -0.38
(0.17) (0.74) (0.71) (0.21) (0.19) (0.33)
Intent to Treat Estimate 0.08* 0.39* -0.41** -0.11* -0.08 -0.10
(0.05) (0.23) (0.21) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.28***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
First Stage F-Statistic 25.45 25.19 25.11 25.53 25.11 14.36
Observations 4,222 1,186 1,184 1,188 1,184 901
Data Source ECV DHS DHS DHS DHS DHS
Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the
2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column.  The first row shows 2SLS estimates
for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The second row
shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county specific eligibility
threshold; for dichotomous dependent variables, marginal probabilities obtained from probit estimates calculated at the mean
of the independent variables are reported .  The third row shows first stage estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized
Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold.  All specifications also include
SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard
errors (clustered by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Use of Preventive Care Health Status (Children)
TABLE 3:



















2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment 0.13** -0.05 0.51 -0.04
(0.06) (0.19) (0.34) (0.06)
Intent to Treat Estimate 0.04** -0.02 0.20* -0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.02)
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.26***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05)
First Stage F-Statistic 25.45 25.11 11.58 25.45
Observations 4,222 1,184 564 4,222
Data Source ECV DHS ECV ECV
Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility
thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of each
column.  The first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR),
instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The second row shows reduced-form
 intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county specific eligibility
threshold; for dichotomous dependent variables, marginal probabilities obtained from probit estimates
calculated at the mean of the independent variables are reported .  The third row shows first stage
estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the
county-specific eligibility threshold.  All specifications also include SISBEN score, distance from the
county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard errors
(clustered by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
TABLE 4:





































2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment -0.05 -21.59 -0.82 0.15 0.52 -0.24
(0.12) (136) (5.27) (0.17) (1.46) (0.37)
Intent to Treat Estimate -0.02 -1.89 -0.22 0.06 0.17 -0.05 -0.025 -0.23*** -0.002 -0.043* -0.36*** -0.001
(0.04) (10.56) (1.41) (0.06) (0.47) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.003) (0.02) (0.04) (0.008)
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.35*** 0.09 0.27*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.36***
(0.06) (0.32) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
First Stage F-Statistic 31.29 0.07 17.56 32.49 11.91 8.44
Observations 1,013 109 962 1,003 528 652 4,222 4,222 4,222 3,276 3,276 3,276
Data Source DHS DHS DHS DHS DHS DHS ECV ECV ECV DHS DHS DHS
Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column.  The
first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated
SISBEN score falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold; for dichotomous dependent variables, marginal probabilities obtained from probit estimates calculated at the mean of the independent variables
are reported.  Intent-to-treat estimates only are reported for the crowd-out analyses of other insurance types (the last six columns).  The third row shows first stage estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized
Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold.  All specifications also include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and
county fixed effects.  Standard errors (clustered by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Ex-Ante Moral Hazard Insurance Crowd-Out
TABLE 5:





















































2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment 1.29 3.05 -0.09 -0.15 0.09 0.05 -0.16 -0.37* 0.001 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04
(3.15) (6.53) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.22) (0.03) (0.07) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) (0.16) (0.20)
Intent to Treat Estimate 0.52 0.79 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.11* 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.002 0.01 -0.01
(1.26) (1.68) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
First Stage F-Statistic 110 25.45 111 24.72 111 24.72 110 25.45 110 25.45 8.71 25.45 28.79 25.45 25.45
Observations 3,276 4,222 3,275 3,764 3,275 3,764 3,276 4,222 3,276 4,222 1,305 4,222 3,010 4,222 4,222
Data Source DHS ECV DHS ECV DHS ECV DHS ECV DHS ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV
Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column.  The first row shows 2SLS
estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county-
specific eligibility threshold; for dichotomous dependent variables, marginal probabilities obtained from probit estimates calculated at the mean of the independent variables are reported .  The third row shows first stage estimates from
OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold.  All specifications also include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy
variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard errors (clustered by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
TABLE 6:
BALANCE ACROSS ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDSAppendix 1: Subsidized Regime Benefits 
 
TYPE OF BENEFIT  AGE / 
POPULATION 
GROUP 















Medications Transportation Excluded 
interventions 
< 1 YEAR  Neonatal care and 





 1-4 years  Well child care, 
immunizations, 
anemia screening 
5-19 years  Well child care, 
immunizations, 
anemia screening 
20-60 years  Cardiovascular and 
renal disease risk 
screening, cervical and 
breast cancer 
screening 
>60 years  Cardiovascular and 
renal disease risk 
















WOMEN  High risk screening, 
STD, prenatal care 
All 






















































     
    
Appendix 2: Components of the SISBEN Index and SISBEN Score Calculations 
 
This appendix describes the components of SISBEN index, details the index 
information available in each household survey, and explains how we calculate SISBEN 
scores in each data source. 
 
1. Components of the SISBEN Index 
As explained in the text of the paper, our study focuses on the original urban SISBEN 
index There are four general types of information used in calculating the SISBEN index: (A) 
human capital, employer characteristics, and benefits; (B) demographics, income, and labor 
force participation; (C) housing characteristics; and (D) access to public utilities.  The index 
is composed of 14 components across these categories.  For each component, respondents are 
categorized according to mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive polychotomous response 
categories.  Each response category for each component corresponds to a weight or “points,” 
and index scores are calculated by summing across points.  Scores range between 0 and 100; 
higher scores denote higher socio-economic status. 
The specific components of the index are: 
 
(A) Human Capital; Employer Characteristics and Benefits 
-  (1) Educational attainment of the household head 
-  (2) Mean Schooling for household members twelve years old and older 
-  (3) Firm size and provision of Social Security benefits for the household head 
 
(B) Demographics, Income, and Labor Force Participation 
-  (4) Proportion of children six years old and under (as share of children under age 
eighteen) 
-  (5) Proportion of household members employed (as a share of those older than 
twelve) 
-  (6) Per capita income indexed to the minimum wage (all types of income are 
counted) 
 
(C) Housing Characteristics 
-  (7) Number of rooms per person 
-  (8) Primary wall material 
-  (9) Primary roof material 
-  (10) Primary floor material 
-  (11) Number of appliances (among those on a pre-determined list) 
 
(D) Access to Public Utilities 
-  (12) Water source 
-  (13) Sewage disposal 
-  (14) Garbage disposal 
 
2. SISBEN Components Available in Each Household Survey 
  Our analyses use the 2003 ECV and the 2005 DHS.  The table below shows which 
SISBEN components are available in each survey.    
 
Variable  DHS 2005  ECV 2003 
Educational Attainment  Available  Available 
Employment Status  Available  Available 
Social Security Benefits       
Health Insurance  Available  Available 
Pension  Not Available  Available 
Firm Size (Number of Employees)  Not Available  Available 
Age  Available  Available 
Income  Not available  Available 
Number of Rooms  Available  Available 
Primary Wall Material  Available  Available 
Primary Roof Material  Not available  Not available 
Primary Floor Material  Available  Available 
Number of Appliances       
TV  Available  Available 
Refrigerator  Available  Available 
Air Conditioner  Available  Available 
Blender  Available  Available 
Washing Machine  Available  Available 
Water Source  Available  Available 
Sewage Disposal  Available  Available 
Garbage Disposal  Available  Available 
 
Most SISBEN components are available in the household surveys we use in our primary 
analyses (nearly all in the 2003 ECV and the great majority in the 2005 DHS).  For missing 
components, we use an ordered probit procedure to predict the most likely response category 
for each missing component using a large number of observable household characteristics.  
The section below describes how we performed our SISBEN score calculations. 
 
3. SISBEN Score Calculations 
In this section we report SISBEN index weights for each response category for each 
component and describe how we impute scores for components not represented in our 
household surveys.  SISBEN index scores are then calculated by summing weights or points 
across all components.   
 
A. Human Capital; Employer Characteristics and Benefits 
 
1. Educational attainment of the household head 
 
1  No education  0 
2  Some elementary  1.6239 
3  Complete elementary  3.4435 
4  Some secondary  5.0039 
5  Complete secondary  7.3434 
6  Some of higher education  9.7833 
7  Complete higher education  11.546 
8  Graduate studies  12.4806 
    
To compute educational attainment, we use information of level of schooling completed and 
number of years of schooling.  Levels of schooling correspond to the following number of 
years of education:  
·  Complete elementary school: 5 years 
·  Complete secondary education: 11 years 
·  Complete higher education: 16 years 
·  Graduate studies: 16 or more years 
Sufficient information on level and years of schooling is available to compute this variable in 
all household surveys.  
 
2. Mean Schooling for household members twelve years old and older 
 
1  0 years  0 
2  Between 0 and 4 years  1.657 
3  Between 4 and 5 years  2.9947 
4  Between 5 and 10 years  4.969 
5  Between 10 and 11 years  7.6387 
6  Between 11 and 15 years  9.4425 
7  Between 15 and 16 years  10.69 
8  16 years or more  11.1396 
 
Using the coding scheme described for calculating educational attainment for the household 
head, we calculate mean years of schooling for all household members 12 and older. 
Sufficient information is available to compute this variable in all household surveys.  
 
3. Firm size and provision of Social Security benefits for the household head 
 
1 
Without benefits and either works alone or does not 
work  0 
2 
Without benefits and works in firm with 2 to 9 
employees  1.166 
3 
Without benefits and works in firm with 10 or more 
employees  2.6545 
4 
With benefits and either works alone or does not 
work  3.9539 
5 
Without benefits and works in firm with 2 to 9 
employees  5.8427 
6 
Without benefits and works in firm with 10 or more 
employees  6.9718 
 
Assigning response categories for this index component requires information about 
employment status, social security benefits (health insurance and pension benefits), and firm 
size: 
·  Employment status is available in all household surveys. 
·  Firm size is not available in the 2005 DHS.  We therefore use ordered probit models to 
predict the probability of falling into each of the three firm size categories (1 employee, 
2-9 employees, 10 or more employees).  We then select the category with the highest 
predicted probability.  To obtain parametric estimates of the relationship between a 
variety of observable household characteristics (demographic characteristics, education,    
and regional controls among urban residents) and firm size, we estimate these ordered 
probit models using the 2003 ECV 
·  Social Security benefits consist of two components: health insurance benefits and pension 
benefits: 
-  Health Insurance Benefits. Health insurance status is judged in each household 
survey in the following way: 
ECV 2003: Has health insurance if affiliated with “ISS,” “Caja de Prevision,” 
“army/police” insurance scheme, “Ecopetrol” scheme, the “educational system” 
scheme, or an “EPS – different to ISS or Caja de Prevision.”  Those with 
insurance through an “ARS” or “Empresa solidaria” are excluded. 
DHS 2005: Has health insurance if affiliated with “ISS,” “EPS,” “Public 
Agency,” “army/police” insurance scheme, “Ecopetrol” scheme, the 
“educational system”scheme, or “Foncolpuertos.”  Those with insurance 
through an “ARS” are excluded. 
-  Pension Benefits. Pension benefits are judged according to affiliation with the public 
or private pension system. This information is available in the 2003 ECV but not in 
the 2005 DHS. 
 
In the 2003 ECV, Social Security benefits are judged according to having health insurance 
and/or pension benefits.  In the 2005 DHS, Social Security benefits are judged according to 
health insurance benefits. 
 
(B) Demographics, Income, and Labor Force Participation 
 
(4) Proportion of children six years old and under (as share of children under age eighteen) 
 
1  Greater than 0.65  0 
2  From 0 to 0.65  0.2237 
3  Zero  1.4761 
 
Sufficient information is available to compute this variable in all household surveys. 
 
(5) Proportion of household members employed (as a share of those older than twelve) 
 
1  Less than 0.30  0 
2  From 0.30 to 0.60  0.6717 
3  From 0.60 to 0.90  1.739 
4  Greater than 0.90  4.0149 
 
For constructing this proportion, employment is defined as having worked in the preceding 
week, not having worked but having regular job, or receiving payment for working more than 
one hour.  Sufficient information is available to compute this variable in all household 
surveys. 
    
(6) Per capita income indexed to the minimum wage (all types of income are counted) 
 
1  Up to  0.15  0 
2  Above 0.15 up to 0.25  0.8476 
3  Above 0.25 up to 0.35  2.1828 
4  Above 0.35 up to 0.50  3.5362 
5  Above 0.50 up to 0.75  5.3636 
6  Above 0.75 up to 1.00  7.0827 
7  Above 1.00 up to 1.25  8.2489 
8  Above 1.25 up to 1.50  9.4853 
9  Above 1.50 up to 2.00  10.2098 
10  Above 2.00 up to 3.00  11.3999 
11  Above 3.00 up to 4.00  13.0872 
12  Above 4.00  13.7378 
 
To calculate per capita income for a family, we define income to include labor income from 
primary and secondary jobs (both for the employed and self-employed) and pension benefits 
for retirees.  In-kind subsides are excluded.  We obtained nominal minimum wage 




Minimum wage (in 
Colombian pesos) 
2003  332,000.0 
2005  381,500.0 
 
Income variables are available only in the 2003 ECV.  For the 2005 DHS, we use ordered 
probit models to predict the probability of falling into each of 12 discrete categories; we then 
select the category with the highest predicted probability.  To obtain parametric estimates of 
the relationship between a variety of observable household characteristics (demographic 
characteristics, education, and regional controls among urban residents) and firm size, we 
estimate these ordered probit models using the 2003 ECV.   
 
(C) Housing Characteristics 
 
(7) Number of rooms per person 
 
1  Less than 0.20  0 
2  0.20 to 0.30  0.5584 
3  0.30 to 0.40  1.6535 
4  0.40 to 0.70  2.5727 
5  0.70 to 1.00  4.3886 
6  1.00 to 4.00  6.0042 
7  Greater than 4.00  8.3828 
 
To assign response categories for this index component, rooms are defined as rooms 
exclusively used by household members (including living rooms but excluding kitchens, 
bathrooms, garages, and rooms used for business). This information is available in the 2003 
ECV.  For the 2005 DHS, we use number of rooms used by household members for sleeping.    
(8) Primary wall material 
 
1  Without walls or with bamboo or other organic materials  0 
2  Zinc, cloth, cardboard, cans  0.2473 
3  Raw wood  2.0207 
4  Mud and cane wall  4.8586 
5  Adobe, wide mud wall  6.2845 
6  Block, bricks, stone, prefabricated material, polished wood  7.7321 
 
Information on wall material is available in both the 2003 ECV and the 2005 DHS.  
 
(9) Primary roof material 
 
1  Straw or palm leaves  0 
2 
Recycled household materials (cardboard, cans, 
burlap sacks, etc)  2.1043 
3  Zinc, asbestos, cement, without ceiling  3.7779 
4  Clay tile, zinc, asbestos, cement, with ceiling  5.0973 
 
Information on primary roof material is available only in the 1997 ECV.  We therefore use 
parametric estimates of the relationship between observable characteristics (number of 
rooms, floor material and regional dummies among urban households) and roof material 
obtained from an ordered probit model fit with the 1997 ECV to predict the probability of 
falling into each roof material category shown above.  We assign the category with the 
highest predicted probability.   
 
(10) Primary floor material 
 
1  Dirt  0 
2  Raw wood, boards  2.9037 
3  Cement  3.6967 
4  Floor tile (clay, vinyl), brick or paving tile  5.8712 
5  Wall to wall carpet, marble, polished wood  6.8915 
 
Sufficient information is available to compute this variable in all household surveys.   
 
(11) Number of appliances (among those on a pre-determined list) 
 
1  No appliances  0 
2  1-3 basic appliances basics  2.1435 
3  4 basic appliances without laundry machine  3.0763 
4  3 or more basic appliances with laundry machine  4.7194 
 
For this SISBEN index component, four appliances are considered “basic” (TVs, 
refrigerators, blenders, and air conditioners) and a washing/laundry machine is treated 
separately as shown in the table above.  All necessary information about appliances is present 
in both the 2003 ECV and the 2005 DHS.   
    
(D) Access to Public Utilities 
 
(12) Water source 
 
1  River or spring  0 
2  Public fountain or other source  1.1606 
3  Well without water pump, container or rain water  2.6497 
4  Well with water pump  4.6037 
5  Container truck  6.1693 
6  Aqueduct  7.2554 
 
All necessary information for assigning response categories is available in the 2003 ECV.    
In the 2005 DHS, we classify “bottled water” as “aqueduct.”  
 
(13) Sewage disposal 
 
1  No sewage  0 
2  Latrine  2.4519 
3  Toilet without connection to sewer or septic tank  3.3323 
4  Toilet with connection to septic tank  3.9615 
5  Toilet with connection to sewer  6.8306 
 
Information on sewage disposal is available in all household surveys, but in the 2005 DHS, 
some minor coding assumptions were necessary.    In the 2005 DHS, we code both 
“traditional pit toilet” and “traditional toilet to sea/river” as “latrine.” 
 
(14) Garbage disposal 
 
1  Yard, lot, river, etc.  0 
2  Local container or public trashcan  2.1291 
3  Picked up by public services  3.2701 
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Appendix 3, Figure 4: Behavioral Distortions

































Spending       
≥ 1,200,000
Bandwidth 2 -60,371* 3,562 -62,109* 2,620 -0.03* -0.02** -0.02**
(33,166) (3,307) (32,860) (3,160) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 3 -46,561* 704 -48,237* -501 -0.02 -0.01* -0.01
(27,208) (3,939) (26,931) (3,856) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 4 -62,047** 2,544 -62,512** 1,207 -0.03* -0.02** -0.02*
(30,387) (4,018) (30,152) (3,921) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 2 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial -149,854* 10,029 -151,503* 9,092 -0.06* -0.04* -0.05*
(84,609) (7,946) (84,197) (7,639) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Bandwidth 3 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial -84,792** -93.4 -86,252** -1,169 -0.03** -0.03** -0.03**
(43,097) (5,831) (42,730) (5,708) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 4 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial -42,084 -1,483 -42,573 -2,700 -0.02* -0.01* -0.01
(30,161) (5,155) (29,886) (5,088) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 2 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions -54,935* 4,128 -56,529* 3,238 -0.02* -0.02** -0.02**
(29,227) (3,518) (28,916) (3,375) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 3 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions -43,404* 1,634 -45,170* 429 -0.02 -0.01* -0.01*
(25,327) (3,802) (25,052) (3,709) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 4 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions -64,040** 4,071 -64,544** 2,712 -0.02* -0.02** -0.02**
(31,648) (3,723) (31,423) (3,611) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 2 without County Fixed Effects -63,012 -1,996 -64,910 -2,957 -0.03* -0.02 -0.02
(41,233) (6,967) (40,957) (6,894) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 3 without County Fixed Effects -44,629 -56.4 -46,507 -1,216 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(29,815) (5,175) (29,589) (5,112) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 4 without County Fixed Effects -61,221* 1,343 -61,853* 24.02 -0.03* -0.02* -0.01*
(33,074) (5,477) (32,859) (5,403) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 2 Local Linear Regression -89,480 -121 -91,184 -1,032 -0.04** -0.02* -0.03
(65,470) (9,519) (58,670) (9,535) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Bandwidth 3 Local Linear Regression -60,282 156 -62,112 -925 -0.03** -0.02 -0.02*
(37,413) (6,094) (41,334) (5,492) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bandwidth 4 Local Linear Regression -52,559 856 -53,164 -354 -0.02* -0.02* -0.01*
(33,833) (5,153) (33,447) (5,364) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Data Source ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV












Has Car Has Radio
Bandwidth 2 -342 30,366 32,136 -33,826 0.07 0.14
(4,963) (25,733) (104,871) (305,878) (0.04) (0.11)
Bandwidth 3 2,599 28,059 -1,495 -320,415 0.08** 0.14
(4,554) (23,228) (88,770) (356,917) (0.04) (0.11)
Bandwidth 4 2,613 25,670 18,654 -348,373 0.09** 0.23**
(4,667) (23,564) (93,938) (374,759) (0.04) (0.10)
Bandwidth 2 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial -7,023 7,150 3,136 -776,577* 0.09* 0.19
(11,759) (46,641) (185,284) (457,479) (0.05) (0.13)
Bandwidth 3 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial -2,350 27,095 27,129 -362,101 0.08* 0.10
(6,365) (33,363) (128,735) (396,651) (0.05) (0.12)
Bandwidth 4 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 1,842 28,281 14,132 -319,591 0.08* 0.10
(4,564) (25,329) (94,706) (348,511) (0.04) (0.11)
Bandwidth 2 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions -1384 30,593 32,790 -63,185 0.07 0.11
(5,298) (27,146) (103,778) (330,739) (0.04) (0.11)
Bandwidth 3 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 1,884 25,782 -837 -326,491 0.08** 0.12
(4,711) (25,127) (92,515) (367,999) (0.04) (0.11)
Bandwidth 4 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 2,243 24,374 27,751 -230,269 0.09** 0.22**
(4,844) (26,122) (96,361) (356,416) (0.04) (0.10)
Bandwidth 2 without County Fixed Effects 3,595 40,950 -76 7,924 0.06 0.13
(5,148) (26,487) (125,627) (448,543) (0.05) (0.14)
Bandwidth 3 without County Fixed Effects 4,882 31,351 -5,734 -315,118 0.08* 0.17
(4,473) (22,030) (105,874) (404,085) (0.05) (0.13)
Bandwidth 4 without County Fixed Effects 4,495 29,234 8,948 -466,629 0.08** 0.27**
(4,832) (23,487) (114,144) (439,817) (0.04) (0.12)
Bandwidth 2 Local Linear Regression 8,457 60,037 -29,196 -365,953 0.10 0.16
(12,796) (39,775) (148,304) (10,778,000) (0.07) (0.15)
Bandwidth 3 Local Linear Regression 7,512 50,717 -10,243 -202,306 0.09* 0.15
(6,542) (37,386) (122,781) (2,543,245) (0.05) (0.13)
Bandwidth 4 Local Linear Regression 7,619 46,440 3,083 -238,253 0.09* 0.18*
(5,418) (28,926) (115,261) (666,015) (0.05) (0.11)
Data Source ECV ECV ECV ECV DHS DHS
Individual-level “urban” data used from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column; all estimates are 2SLS estimates for enrollment
in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The first three rows report estimates using samples of individuals within two, three,
and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The fourth through sixth rows control for squared, cubic, and fourth power terms of SISBEN
scores using samples of individuals within two, three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The seventh through ninth rows include
interactions between SISBEN scores and an indicator variable for eligibility according to our calculations.  The tenth through twelfth rows do not condition on county fixed effects
and use samples of individuals within two, three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The thirteenth through fifteenth rows report
non-parametric local linear regression estimates obtained through the following process.  First, local linear regression functions (with triangle kernels) are used to estimate conditional
means (conditioning only on SISBEN_diff) of outcome variables on either side of the eligibility threshold.  Second, this estimation process is repeated for enrollment in the SR.  
Finally, Wald statistics are constructed using differences in outcome variable means on either side of the threshold as numerators and the difference in SR enrollment means on either
side of the threshold as the denominator; 250 bootstrap replications are used to estimate standard errors.  All specifications otherwise include SISBEN score, distance from the
county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard errors (clustered by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
APPENDIX 4 TABLE A1:





















Bandwidth 2 0.29* 1.24* -1.30* -0.35* -0.26 -0.38
(0.17) (0.74) (0.71) (0.21) (0.19) (0.33)
Bandwidth 3 0.20 1.75** -1.14 -0.44** -0.45** -0.31
(0.15) (0.73) (0.73) (0.21) (0.20) (0.31)
Bandwidth 4 0.24 2.06*** -1.43* -0.59** -0.60*** -0.16
(0.15) (0.76) (0.80) (0.23) (0.22) (0.42)
Bandwidth 2 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 0.40 1.63** -1.05* -0.31 -0.21 -0.44
(0.31) (0.80) (0.61) (0.21) (0.20) (0.34)
Bandwidth 3 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 0.48** 1.18 -1.13 -0.35 -0.26 -0.28
(0.22) (0.81) (0.70) (0.23) (0.21) (0.36)
Bandwidth 4 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 0.26* 1.67** -0.96 -0.39* -0.39* -0.33
(0.15) (0.78) (0.74) (0.23) (0.22) (0.36)
Bandwidth 2 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 0.27 1.16 -1.30* -0.34* -0.26 -0.37
(0.17) (0.73) (0.70) (0.20) (0.19) (0.32)
Bandwidth 3 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 0.21 1.73** -1.13 -0.43** -0.45** -0.32
(0.15) (0.72) (0.72) (0.21) (0.20) (0.31)
Bandwidth 4 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 0.23 2.06*** -1.43* -0.58** -0.60*** -0.18
(0.16) (0.76) (0.80) (0.23) (0.22) (0.42)
Bandwidth 2 without County Fixed Effects 0.46*** 0.86 -1.24* -0.42* -0.37* -0.51
(0.18) (0.73) (0.72) (0.23) (0.22) (0.44)
Bandwidth 3 without County Fixed Effects 0.32** 1.39* -1.48** -0.49** -0.54** -0.55
(0.14) (0.71) (0.75) (0.23) (0.23) (0.42)
Bandwidth 4 without County Fixed Effects 0.31* 1.37* -1.72** -0.59** -0.61*** -0.47
(0.16) (0.71) (0.77) (0.24) (0.23) (0.52)
Bandwidth 2 Local Linear Regression 0.72** 0.99 -1.21 -0.41* -0.39 2.72*
(0.32) (0.80) (0.80) (0.24) (0.26) (1.54)
Bandwidth 3 Local Linear Regression 0.55*** 1.00 -1.47** -0.43* -0.43* 2.70*
(0.19) (0.75) (0.60) (0.26) (0.25) (1.57)
Bandwidth 4 Local Linear Regression 0.45*** 1.21* -1.53** -0.45** -0.48** 2.49*
(0.16) (0.73) (0.64) (0.23) (0.24) (1.37)
Data Source ECV DHS DHS DHS DHS DHS
Individual-level “urban” data used from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column; all
estimates are 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility.
The first three rows report estimates using samples of individuals within two, three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific
eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The fourth through sixth rows control for squared, cubic, and fourth power terms of SISBEN scores
using samples of individuals within two, three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).
The seventh through ninth rows include interactions between SISBEN scores and an indicator variable for eligibility according to our
calculations.  The tenth through twelfth rows do not condition on county fixed effects and use samples of individuals within two, three,
and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The thirteenth through fifteenth rows report non-
parametric local linear regression estimates obtained through the following process.  First, local linear regression functions (with triangle
kernels) are used to estimate conditional means (conditioning only on SISBEN_diff) of outcome variables on either side of the eligibility
threshold.  Second, this estimation process is repeated for enrollment in the SR.  Finally, Wald statistics are constructed using differences
in outcome variable means on either side of the threshold as numerators and the difference in SR enrollment means on either side of the
threshold as the denominator; 250 bootstrap replications are used to estimate standard errors.  All specifications otherwise include
SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard errors (clustered
by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Use of Preventive Care Health Status (Children)
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Bandwidth 2 0.13** -0.05 0.51 -0.04
(0.06) (0.19) (0.34) (0.06)
Bandwidth 3 0.15*** -0.08 0.26 -0.05
(0.06) (0.18) (0.24) (0.06)
Bandwidth 4 0.16*** -0.15 0.60** -0.03
(0.06) (0.19) (0.30) (0.06)
Bandwidth 2 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 0.23* -0.05 1.79 -0.08
(0.14) (0.19) (2.13) (0.13)
Bandwidth 3 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 0.18** 0.03 0.83 -0.07
(0.08) (0.20) (0.65) (0.08)
Bandwidth 4 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 0.14** -0.05 0.21 -0.03
(0.06) (0.20) (0.23) (0.06)
Bandwidth 2 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 0.12** -0.05 0.56* -0.03
(0.06) (0.18) (0.34) (0.06)
Bandwidth 3 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 0.15*** -0.08 0.28 -0.04
(0.06) (0.18) (0.24) (0.06)
Bandwidth 4 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 0.16*** -0.15 0.60** -0.03
(0.06) (0.19) (0.30) (0.06)
Bandwidth 2 without County Fixed Effects 0.14** -0.18 0.41 0.00
(0.06) (0.21) (0.27) (0.06)
Bandwidth 3 without County Fixed Effects 0.14*** -0.21 0.22 -0.01
(0.05) (0.20) (0.20) (0.05)
Bandwidth 4 without County Fixed Effects 0.16*** -0.23 0.55** 0.00
(0.06) (0.20) (0.24) (0.06)
Bandwidth 2 Local Linear Regression 0.13 -0.20 0.99 0.01
(0.08) (0.22) (4.34) (0.09)
Bandwidth 3 Local Linear Regression 0.13** -0.19 0.55* 0.00
(0.07) (0.22) (0.32) (0.06)
Bandwidth 4 Local Linear Regression 0.14** -0.22 0.48* 0.01
(0.06) (0.19) (0.27) (0.06)
Data Source ECV DHS ECV ECV
Individual-level “urban” data used from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of
each column; all estimates are 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR
enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The first three rows report estimates using samples of individuals within two,
three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The fourth through sixth
rows control for squared, cubic, and fourth power terms of SISBEN scores using samples of individuals within two,
three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The seventh through ninth
rows include interactions between SISBEN scores and an indicator variable for eligibility according to our calculations.
The tenth through twelfth rows do not condition on county fixed effects and use samples of individuals within two,
three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The thirteenth through
fifteenth rows report non-parametric local linear regression estimates obtained through the following process.  First,
local linear regression functions (with triangle kernels) are used to estimate conditional means (conditioning only on
SISBEN_diff) of outcome variables on either side of the eligibility threshold.  Second, this estimation process is
repeated for enrollment in the SR.  Finally, Wald statistics are constructed using differences in outcome variable means
on either side of the threshold as numerators and the difference in SR enrollment means on either side of the threshold
as the denominator; 250 bootstrap replications are used to estimate standard errors.  All specifications otherwise include
SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard
errors (clustered by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
APPENDIX 4 TABLE A3:






















Bandwidth 2 -0.05 -21.59 -0.82 0.15 0.52 -0.05
(0.12) (136.39) (5.27) (0.17) (1.46) (0.09)
Bandwidth 3 0.02 1.20 -0.66 0.27 0.72 -0.11
(0.10) (289.72) (4.63) (0.17) (1.17) (0.08)
Bandwidth 4 -0.01 6.39 -0.18 0.16 0.47 -0.02
(0.10) (264.01) (4.91) (0.16) (1.17) (0.08)
Bandwidth 2 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial -0.09 39.35 -0.79 0.04 2.82 -0.07
(0.14) (428.76) (5.64) (0.20) (2.20) (0.11)
Bandwidth 3 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial -0.02 0.10 -0.63 0.12 1.84 -0.02
(0.12) (130.13) (5.55) (0.18) (1.63) (0.10)
Bandwidth 4 with Higher Order SISBEN Polynomial 0.00 4.59 -0.46 0.18 1.08 -0.06
(0.11) (106.85) (4.97) (0.17) (1.25) (0.09)
Bandwidth 2 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions -0.05 -11.75 -0.54 0.14 0.34 -0.06
(0.11) (123.55) (5.20) (0.17) (1.45) (0.09)
Bandwidth 3 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions 0.02 24.31 -0.34 0.27 0.63 -0.11
(0.10) (230.17) (4.60) (0.17) (1.16) (0.08)
Bandwidth 4 with SISBEN×Eligible Interactions -0.01 20.30 -0.07 0.16 0.50 -0.02
(0.10) (198.63) (4.90) (0.16) (1.17) (0.08)
Bandwidth 2 without County Fixed Effects -0.06 -19.65 4.79 0.18 1.46 0.00
(0.12) (56.39) (5.24) (0.19) (1.47) (0.10)
Bandwidth 3 without County Fixed Effects -0.01 -10.84 3.66 0.25 0.86 -0.07
(0.11) (20.51) (4.57) (0.18) (1.18) (0.09)
Bandwidth 4 without County Fixed Effects -0.01 -3.43 2.91 0.14 0.91 0.00
(0.11) (14.97) (4.63) (0.17) (1.18) (0.08)
Bandwidth 2 Local Linear Regression -0.06 -23.92 6.37 0.16 3.06 -0.20
(0.16) (353.52) (5.90) (0.23) (2.50) (0.53)
Bandwidth 3 Local Linear Regression -0.01 -17.09 5.32 0.21 1.79 -0.07
(0.12) (257.54) (4.99) (0.20) (2.09) (0.55)
Bandwidth 4 Local Linear Regression 0.00 -13.82 4.14 0.17 1.21 0.01
(0.10) (130.82) (4.60) (0.16) (1.22) (0.46)
Data Source DHS DHS DHS DHS DHS DHS
Individual-level “urban” data used from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column; all estimates
are 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility.  The first three
rows report estimates using samples of individuals within two, three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds
(respectively).  The fourth through sixth rows control for squared, cubic, and fourth power terms of SISBEN scores using samples of individuals
within two, three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds (respectively).  The seventh through ninth rows include
interactions between SISBEN scores and an indicator variable for eligibility according to our calculations.  The tenth through twelfth rows do not
condition on county fixed effects and use samples of individuals within two, three, and four SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility
thresholds (respectively).  The thirteenth through fifteenth rows report non-parametric local linear regression estimates obtained through the
following process.  First, local linear regression functions (with triangle kernels) are used to estimate conditional means (conditioning only on
SISBEN_diff) of outcome variables on either side of the eligibility threshold.  Second, this estimation process is repeated for enrollment in the SR.
Finally, Wald statistics are constructed using differences in outcome variable means on either side of the threshold as numerators and the difference
in SR enrollment means on either side of the threshold as the denominator; 250 bootstrap replications are used to estimate standard errors.  All
specifications otherwise include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.
Standard errors (clustered by household) are shown in parentheses below each estimate.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
ROBUSTNESS OF BEHAVIORAL DISORTION RESULTS (EX ANTE MORAL HAZARD)
APPENDIX 4 TABLE A4: